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Brazi l ’s international profi le is sustained by its soft  power expressed in 
terms of the capacity to persuade, negotiate and mediate. As ex-foreign minister 
Celso Amorim indicates, “[i]n the present-day world, mil itary power wi l l  be less  
and less usable in a way that these other abil i t ies – the capacity to negotiate based 
on sound economic policies,  based on a society that is more just  than it  used to be 
and wil l  be more just  tomorrow than it  is  today” (“The Soft-Power Power”).  In the 
last  two decades,  Brazi l ian leaders consolidated relat ions with global powers such 
as the U.S.  and the European Union through careful negotiat ion in order to avoid 
hosti l ity and develop a sense of l imited divergence (Lima and Hirst) .  At the same 
t ime, those leaders aimed at  reducing power asymmetries in North-South relat ions 
with the coordination of posit ions with developing countries and non-tradit ional 
partners (Vigevani and Cepaluni 1309-1326).  Brazil ian authorit ies look forward to 
reshaping internat ional  inst itutions with emphasis on equal representat ion (Hurrell  
and Narl ikar 415-433).  In regional  polit ics,  Brazi l ’s  prominent posit ion in South 
America was constructed through negotiation aiming at the development of strong 
polit ical  t ies with Argentinean authorit ies and,  in the 2000s,  better relat ions with 
left ist  leaders such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia ’s Evo Morales.  In 
multi lateral  institutions,  Brazi l ian negotiators used diplomatic tools that 
consolidated the legit imacy of their cla ims for the reformulation of decis ion-
making structures (Lima and Hirst  25-33) .   
Brazi l ian foreign policy’s l i terature indicates that the development of a 
“benign power” profi le is not recent.  Gelson Fonseca Jr.  (356-359) indicates that 
  
Brazi l ’s  preference for negotiat ion and mediation created some advantages 
internat ionally,  because a necessary condition for modernization was a peaceful  
internat ional environment.  Thus consensus was not a value in itself ,  but an 
understanding of mult iple interests ,  necessary for the legit imacy of Brazi l ’s  claims 
for international  project ion.  According to Amado Cervo (204-205),  cordial ity was 
based on the perception of national greatness,  which would make feel ings of 
hosti l i ty superfluous for Brazi l ian leaders.  Zairo Cheibub (122-124) indicates that,  
through negotiat ion and international arbitrat ion, Brazil  could define its terr itorial  
borders and el iminate disputes about them, trying not to be charged of imperial  
expansionism. Alexandra Si lva (97-102) argues that pacif ism and rule of law 
created continuity and coherence in the country’s foreign policy,  which 
strengthened Brazi l ian supremacy in South America and national  unity through the 
consolidat ion of its sovereignty.  In the academic debates on Brazi l ian foreign 
policy,  i t  is possible to detect the consensus on Brazi l ’s “benign” international 
insertion,  coherent with its long-standing interests of autonomy and development, 
but less attention is given on the perpetuation of subtle forms of exclusion 
through this soft-power identity,  as well  as its  main impacts on the maintenance of 
hierarchies that marginal ize difference in the international  level,  though not always 
in an explicit  way. 
I argue that Brazi l ian leaders and diplomats maintain a “benign wonder” 
based on negotiat ion and mediat ion abil i t ies,  but this perspective is  not innocent 
or humble, not only in the sense of sat isfaction of Brazi l ian long-standing interests 
of autonomy and development. This artic le sustains that,  in the archetype of “soft-
power power”, logocentric structures and dichotomous ways of thinking in 
relat ions with developing countries and global powers remain active in Brazi l ian 
foreign policy,  though there is  space for mediation with difference. The apparatus 
of exclusion in relat ions between Brazil  and other countries creates obstacles for 
the recognit ion of the wealth of difference, the development of common 
experiences towards the destabi l izat ion of hierarchies and the sharing of values 
that transcend norms of coexistence. The effect of the maintenance of those 
divisions is  the diff iculty to look for common gains and to construct stronger 
  
bases for an effect ive management of col lective problems. Difference represented 
by underdeveloped and other developing countries is  sometimes understood as 
“anomaly” or “backwardness” in relat ion to democratic or l iberal  models of 
development achieved by Brazi l .  There is a pattern of “exclusion through 
inclusion”, which means that Brazil  develops an apparently inclusive perspective 
of difference in order to preserve and manage hierarchies.  Developed and more 
powerful countries are not explicit ly labeled as tradit ional “imperial ists” or 
“dominators”,  but the emphasis on their ambit ion and abil ity to use force and 
inst itutions in their benefit  updates old colonial  discourses not necessari ly in order 
to destabil ize hierarchies,  but to question Brazil ’s inferior posit ions. Depreciat ive 
vis ions of difference are updated, and hierarchies are not overcome as modern 
regulatory ambitions. These hierarchies are constantly reart iculated and reinvented.  
Exclusion can be art iculated in complex ways. There is the possibi l i ty of 
mediation with difference, but the mediation can provide a path for exceptionalism 
when certain ways of l iving are conceived as non-acceptable. The supposed 
freedom of difference can be condit ioned to some kind of authority,  for example 
(Walker) .  The postcolonial  perspective adopted in this art icle gives emphasis to 
the fact  that difference can be managed not only with spat ial  strategies of 
segmentat ion, but also temporal  mechanisms of exclusion with the application of 
notions of development and modernization,  which consolidate difference as 
“backwardness”, “barbarianism” or “dysfunction” (Blaney and Inayatul lah 21-45).  
Difference confers posit ive content to the “advance” of the “civi l ization” of the 
Self .  From this perspective, the crystal l ization of spatial  boundaries between inside 
and outside occurs concomitantly with the permanence of different “stages of 
development” in a l inear interpretat ion of t ime. Difference is  located in the 
inferior stages compared to the “advanced civi l izations” (Blaney and Inayatul lah 
93-125, 161-185).  Based on the work of Sakaran Krishna, I  wi l l  develop the idea 
that dominant discourses that equate modernizat ion with “civi l izat ion”, 
development and progress can become instruments of power in the hands of once-
colonized states in the developing world (Krishna 4) ,  such as Brazi l .  Those 
dominant discourses are more explicit  in Brazil ’s relat ions with underdeveloped 
  
and developing countries.  In order to have a stronger dialogue with the l i terature 
of postcolonial  studies,  I wi l l  apply Edward Said’s cr it ique of notions of 
civi l izat ional superiority and exclusive claims to rational ity or object ivity .  Inspired 
by Homi Bhabha, I wil l  argue that polit ics – including international polit ics and 
foreign pol icy – is  performative.  At the end of this art icle,  I wi l l  emphasize the 
negotiat ions between identity and difference,  as wel l  as the ambiguous and split  
selves that emerge from those negotiat ions. The mentioned ambiguity can be a 
source of creat ive polit ical  engagements in Brazil ’s  relat ions with other countries.  
It  can indicate a hybrid space where negotiat ion between the authority and its 
supposed supplicants can occur and change,  according to Krishna (78-79, 96).   
In the next sections,  I wi l l  examine how hierarchies persist in Brazi l ’s  
relat ions with underdeveloped/developing countries and global powers,  
respectively.  The examined discourses wil l  be mainly the speeches,  declarat ions 
and interviews of government officia ls – special ly the president and/or the foreign 
minister – during Brazil ’s  two previous administrat ions,  Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (1995-2002) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010),  as well  as 
authorit ies of other countries in response to Brazi l ’s decisions1. 
Brazil’s relations with underdeveloped and developing countries    
Many Brazi l ian authorit ies bel ieve that the Southern Cone and Latin 
America are becoming what Amorim cal led a “security community,  in which war 
becomes inconceivable” (“The Soft-Power Power”).  In Mercosul’s  10th Social  
Summit of December 2010, the then Brazi l ian president Lula urged the members 
of the economic bloc to move forward in the integration process towards the 
                                                 
1 I do not argue that the process of hierarchization has always been defined in the same way in different moments of 
Brazilian foreign policy history. Second, I understand that the words “developed” and “developing” used in this article 
carry strategies of exclusion and marginalization and denounce the existence of a “linear” perspective of time. But it is 
important to highlight that I do not assume them in an uncritical manner. In this analysis, I will question them as natural 
concepts and will explicit the hierarchies inscribed in them. Third, I also recognize that an orthodox realist account 
would see the image of a “benign country” as a cover for power. However, the theoretical perspective adopted in this 
article focus on how discourse defines hierarchies between identity and difference and has practical effects in those 
relations, while a realist perspective would not develop those issues in detail. Fourth, when I refer to “Brazil”, it is 
important to notice that I do not see it as an unproblematic homogeneous unit of analysis. I will focus on discourses of 
exclusion created by Brazil’s main foreign policy decision-makers and institutions, but I will not obliterate differences 
among domestic actors. Those differences will be discussed whenever they affect Brazil’s international profile. 
  
construction of a "Mercosul identity",  a term coined by the president himself .  In 
his view, the leaders of the region had overcome the disputes in terms of who was 
closer to U.S. interests and had important achievements,  ranging from the 
agreement on the nat ional benches in Parl iament – and the bloc's  direct  elect ion of 
representatives to this part icular institution – to the privileged economic and 
polit ical  s ituat ion after the 2008 f inancial cris is .  Although Lula had indicated a 
higher level of convergence in the polit ical  relat ionship among the members – "we 
are not here to talk about nuclear bombs, nor war" –,  there are several  
impediments to integrat ion. They range from the lack of an eff icient mechanism 
for dispute sett lement to the diff iculty of developing the idea of integration in the 
collective imaginat ion of its members’ societ ies (Oliveira) .  
Divisions between identity and difference indicate the permanence of 
dichotomous ways of thinking about the regional  relat ions in the Southern Cone. 
Within Mercosul,  i t  is  possible to observe the persistence of a tradit ional pattern 
of trade among the members:  Brazi l  continues to import commodities and export 
manufactured goods to other members.  Moreover, the bloc had a l imited role in 
stimulating the competit iveness of regional exports,  part icularly manufactured 
goods to markets in the developed world,  and f ighting endogenous reasons for the 
lack of competit iveness of industrial  imports (Vaz).  At the intra-regional level ,  
different views about the integrat ion process – that prevent the coordination of 
posit ions – and individual strategic interests remain, which take precedence over 
the al l iance between leaders and societies.  Many of these differences arise from the 
conception that Paraguay and Uruguay are relegated to a marginal or submissive 
posit ion in the distr ibution of gains within the bloc by Brazi l  and Argentina,  which 
account for most of the benefits of economic activity spurred by integration.  
According to the Uruguayan advisor of the Chamber of Commerce Dolores 
Benavente, “Mercosul is  l ike a family:  Brazi l  is  the father; Argentina,  the mother;  
Uruguay and Paraguay, the kids” (Gerchmann, my translat ion) .  The logic – 
recognized even by weaker countries’  authorit ies – is  that the different – seen as 
"less ski l led" and "less developed" l ike “children” – are placed in subordinate 
posit ions to the stronger and economically more vibrant members,  labeled as 
  
"advanced" and "more appropriate" to the parameters of international economy. 
By natural izing such categorization, the marginal ization of the economical ly 
weakest members is  perpetuated, even though the interaction with the strongest is 
not interrupted.  
Since 2006,  Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s leaders have made it  clear that t ime 
was running out to meet their demands regarding the el imination of asymmetries in 
the bloc and thus ensure their stay in Mercosul .  Paraguayan authorit ies said that 
their country would leave the bloc if  Brazi l  and Argentina did not interrupt their 
protectionist  pract ices.  In 2006, Uruguayan authorit ies argued that Mercosul 
should have f lexible rules on trade with countries outside the integrat ion process.  
They stated that,  in case of Brazi l ’s  non-acceptance of a free trade agreement with 
the U.S. ,  Uruguay could change its  status in Mercosul to the one of associated 
country.  Brazi l ian leaders have not categorical ly rejected the init iat ive of Uruguay 
to seek bi lateral  agreements,  provided that it  did not compromise compliance with 
the Common External  Tariff  (CET),  which is a central  axis of the bloc. Uruguayan 
leaders al leged that the fai lures of Mercosul prevented further progress regarding 
the expansion of access to other markets and that their country was damaged by 
"significant costs" such as deindustrial izat ion of less competit ive sectors and job 
losses.   
The creation of the Mercosul Structural  Convergence Fund in the second 
half  of the 2000s aimed at reducing economic asymmetries among Mercosul 
members, seeking to meet the demands of Uruguay and Paraguay.  With the 
creation of Mercosul  Parl iament in 2006, Lula urged congressmen to think of 
generous policies for smaller countries and saw that the most powerful  countries 
of Mercosul should col laborate in the development of the weakest.  Sti l l ,  even with 
this apparent increased concern with the reduction of asymmetries,  hierarchies 
between stronger and weaker members are perpetuated, and as such they reproduce 
the understanding of weaker countries as "supporting actors" in relat ion to the 
other members.  In the search for a more balanced participation of Paraguay and 
Uruguay, Brazi l ’s  and Argentina’s decision-makers would have to confront the 
  
issue of institutional representativeness beyond the terms in which it  has been 
treated so as to provide the authentic expression of multi lateral ism in Mercosul 
(Bouzas,  “Mercosul,  dez anos depois:  processo de aprendizado ou déjà-vu?”).   
The maintenance of Brazi l ’s  privi leged posit ion in Mercosul is  also possible 
through the dissemination of values and principles that inhibit  the expression of 
difference that represents a threat to its  interests .  For example,  the 1998 Ushuaia 
Protocol st ipulated that democratic institutions were a prerequisite for the 
development of the bloc and changes of the democratic order were barr iers to 
participat ion in the integrat ion process (Almeida, Mercosul  em sua primeira década 
(1991-2001):  uma aval iação po l í t i ca a part ir  do Bras i l ) .  Venezuela – a country in 
process of accession that should incorporate the democratic commitments at  that 
t ime – was conceived by many Brazi l ian polit icians and civi l  society groups as an 
"atypical ," "dysfunctional" or "problematic" model of state that would need to be 
"tamed" under “real” democratic values.  Brazi l ian legislators cr it icized Hugo 
Chávez’s decision not to renew the lease of network transmission of Radio Caracas 
Televisión (RCTV), hindering the freedom of the press and wounding democrat ic 
principles. Chávez responded by labeling Brazi l ian congressmen as “parrots who 
repeat U.S. orders”.  Brazi l ian Congress ratif ied Venezuela’s accession to the bloc 
in 2009, but many Brazi l ian senators complained about Chávez and Venezuela.  
During talks with U.S.  off icials  (who suggested “intel l igence sharing” with the 
Brazi l ians in order to monitor the Venezuelans) ,  Amorim declared that Brazi l  did 
not see Chávez as a threat (Viana).  However, in a confidential telegram revealed by 
WikiLeaks, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim labels Venezuela as a “new threat to 
regional stabil i ty” and says that “Brazi l ian people consider plausible a mil itary 
incursion by Chávez in a neighboring country because of his unpredictable 
character”. This was one of the main reasons for the creat ion of a South American 
Defense Council  in order to “insert Venezuela and other countries of the region in 
a common organization that Brazi l  can control” (“Celso Amorim diz que Chávez 
‘ late mais que morde’”,Veja,  my translat ion) . 
  
In spite of the fact  that trade l iberal izat ion has proceeded relat ively quickly 
in Mercosul,  structural  imbalances between Brazi l  and Argentina were not 
el iminated. With r ising budget deficits and weak attraction of foreign investment,  
the “Brazil-dependence” proved negative for Argentina (Almeida, Mercosul  em sua 
primeira década (1991-2001):  uma aval iação pol í t i ca  a part ir  do Brasi l ,  “Problemas 
conjunturais e estruturais da integração na América do Sul:  a trajetória do 
Mercosul  desde suas origens até 2006”).  The negat ive image of Brazi l  in Argentina 
was strengthened after 1999,  when the devaluation of the Brazi l ian real and the 
introduction of a f loating exchange rate have generated not only the react ion of 
Argentina’s private sector,  but also a polit ical-commercial crisis of Mercosul ’s 
external credibil i ty.  At f irst ,  with the permanence of the problems l inked to the 
Argentina’s lack of competitiveness,  Argentinean polit icians saw Brazi l  as a threat .  
Some said that there was a Brazi l ian plan to del iberately harm Argentina and 
doubted Brazil ’s  good intentions. In references to Brazi l ,  Argentinean Economy 
minister Domingo Cavallo said that “countries that devaluate their currencies to 
become more competit ive are doing the same thing as steal ing from their  
neighbors” (Maia, my translat ion) .  Argentinean authorit ies saw such a policy as 
harmful to their  country,  which updated constant cr it icisms that Brazi l  tr ied to 
solve its  internal  problems at  the expense of its neighbors.  The lack of capacity of 
Mercosul  to deal  with the cr isis became even more obvious, especial ly regarding 
problems such as the lack of an appropriate institutional framework for solving 
internal disputes,  the gap created by different perceptions of members about the 
bloc and the weak macroeconomic policy coordination (Souto-Maior 7-10) .  
Although in 2002 President Lula had made promises to rebuild Brazi l ’s  special  
relat ionship with Argentina,  Argentinean authorit ies began to make use of trade 
defense mechanisms considered "abusive" by their  Brazi l ian counterparts ,  such as 
unilateral  safeguards and antidumping measures (Almeida,  “Problemas conjunturais 
e estruturais da integração na América do Sul:  a trajetória do Mercosul desde suas 
origens até 2006”).  If Brazi l  was conceived by Argentine polit icians and 
businessmen as "unfair  and self- interested", Argentina was seen as "weak" by the 
Brazi l ian side.  Amorim’s declarat ion in 2004 puts Brazi l  in a privi leged posit ion 
and marginal izes Argentina as “less dynamic”: 
  
In the beginning of negotiat ions in Mercosul ,  what did Argentinean 
businessmen and public sector want? They saw in Brazi l  a dynamism 
that Argentina didn’t  have, especial ly in the industrial  sector.  They 
wanted to include Argentina into this dynamism, to posit ively  
contaminate Argentine industry,  but,  for various reasons, they 
fol lowed a different track. It  is necessary to get back to this 
dynamism. (…) This won’t be done with automatic safeguards,  
tr iggers that have problems (…) Brazi l  is  the bigger country and it  
wil l  keep having a greater importance in al l  of this (Amorim, 
“Entrevista ao Jornal Valor Econômico”, my translation). 
In relat ion to African countries,  the separation of modernity and 
backwardness;  civi l izat ion and barbarianism was consolidated.  The concept of 
“civi l izat ion”, in the contemporary world,  reaff irms the ideas of socioeconomic 
progress,  viable governments,  human r ights ,  the strengthening of democrat ic 
values and the repudiation of terrorism. It l ives on as a modern regulatory 
ambition,  when it  discipl ines subject ivity and determines identity in part icular 
spatiotemporal contexts.  The “civi l izing” notions are conceived as an ideal of 
social  organization and adapted to the part icularit ies of each place and t ime, giving 
effect to hierarchies that marginal ize difference and ensure the integrity of the 
dominant identity .  In Lula’s  declarations about African countries,  many of those 
hierarchies persisted and ref lected the conception of Africa as a “backward” 
continent. In his visit  to Namibia in 2003, Lula said that the country’s  capital ,  
Windhoek, was “so clean, that it  doesn’t even look l ike Africa” (BBC Brasi l ,  my 
translat ion).  In his conception – shared by different sectors of Brazil ian 
government and society –, Africa’s images are connected to poverty and dirt iness,  
which reif ies a contrast  between African states and the “rich” and “clean” non-
African countries.  Another example was Lula’s  declaration about South Africa’s 
hosting of the 2010 World Cup. Lula said that “it  was necessary that the World 
Cup occurred here [ in South Africa] for the world to see that Africans were as 
civi l ized as those who crit icized them before the event” (Azevedo, my translat ion).  
Although Lula’s  intentions to pay a compliment to South Africa and to the African 
  
countries,  his declaration reif ied the centrality of the concept of civi l ization and 
the hierarchies it  established, according to which African countries were perceived 
as backward, primitive or not as civil ized as non-African states. 
Many would say that declarations l ike those could demonstrate simply the 
existence of an exclusionary vis ion on Lula’s  or his government members’  part .  I  
recognize that statements l ike those alone could not demonstrate the existence of 
an unequivocal  excluding profi le in Brazi l ian foreign policy.  However, those 
individual declarations take a different dimension when, in relat ions between 
Brazi l  and African countries ,  we can identify mechanisms that reveal cultural  and 
polit ical  postures of hierarchizat ion even in official  documents and reports 
produced by Itamaraty,  the Brazi l ian Foreign Ministry.  In its foreign policy 
balance from 2003 to 2010 for the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries – 
composed mostly by African countries –, Brazi l ian Foreign Ministry indicates that: 
For Brazi l ,  the natural  benefits of shared language and common 
cultural-historical heritage, as wel l  as the fact  that the country has 
recognized expertise in strategic sectors for economic and social  
development of African Portuguese-speaking countries and East 
Timor,  such as the case of tropical  agriculture and the fight against  
HIV-AIDS, make these countries singular partners for the 
consolidat ion,  either in bi lateral  or communitarian bases, of the 
South-South cooperation paradigm. Almost half of the resources 
dest ined by Brazi l  to technical  cooperation are destined for African 
Portuguese-speaking countries and East Timor (“Balanço de Polít ica 
Externa 2003/2010”, my translat ion).   
In the off icial  discourse,  Brazil  is  portrayed as the owner of something that 
its  partners do not have: expert ise in strategic sectors for socioeconomic 
development.  It  inserts Brazi l  in a privi leged socioeconomic and cultural  posit ion 
in relat ion to its partners,  creates the logic of superiority of its policies,  and 
reinforces the dependence of other countries on Brazi l ian support in the area of 
technical cooperat ion. The discourse consol idates exclusionary practices in which 
  
the “more civil ized” and “developed” actor helps its “less civi l ized” and 
“backward” partners.  Though this cooperation avoids imposit ions and 
condit ional it ies on aid,  those “comparative advantages” that the Foreign Ministry 
tr ies to highl ight al low the faci l itat ion of the act ion of Brazil ian institutions and 
companies in those countries. 
In other occasions, Brazi l ian authorit ies try to posit  Brazi l  as a “model” to 
inspire “less civi l ized”, “less democrat ic” or “less developed” countries,  
conceiving their solutions for specif ic problems as “natural” or “the best way” to 
solve impasses.  In February 2011, when the Egyptian Parl iament was dissolved 
after President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation, the Brazi l ian ambassador for Egypt 
Cesário Melantonio Neto said that “this is  the natural way to democracy in Egypt.  
We can even compare with Brazi l ’s history.  In our transit ion to democracy, after 
the mil itary regime, we needed a new Parliament and formed a National 
Constitutional Assembly to elaborate a new Constitution for the country, based on 
democrat ic values” (“Embaixador do Brasi l  no Egito apoia dissolução do 
Parlamento”, my translat ion).  This model image of Brazi l  – and also its leaders – is  
also accepted by those who have more common historical roots with Brazi l ians, 
such as the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa.  When Guinea-Bissau’s 
president Malam Bacai Sanhá won national elect ions in 2009, he said that he would 
l ike to be “the Lula of Guinea-Bissau. We share a very similar culture,  we speak 
the same language,  we share the same history.  (…) I would l ike to sit  and talk to 
president Lula.  I ’d l ike to share some points of view on development (…).  There 
are a lot  of good things in Brazi l” (“Presidente diz que quer 'ser o Lula da Guiné-
Bissau'.”) .  Although Brazil ian authorit ies might manipulate and emphasize the 
common aspects of identity with African countries for polit ical  and economic 
convenience,  they put Brazi l ,  again, in a privi leged posit ion that reifies hierarchies.  
Similar patterns are visible in Brazi l ’s  relat ions with Iran,  part icular ly when 
Brazi l  tr ied to mediate between Iran and Western powers – special ly the U.S. – 
regarding the controversial  Iranian nuclear program in May 2010.  Brazi l ian 
authorit ies brokered, along with their  Turkish counterparts,  an agreement in which 
  
Iran agreed to exchange low-enriched uranium for 19,75% enriched fuel  for the 
Tehran Research Reactor.  During the talks,  Brazi l ian negotiators tr ied to show that 
Brazi l  shared with Iran the identity of a developing country that wanted to 
preserve its autonomy and the inalienable r ights to develop peaceful nuclear 
activit ies.  However,  in the eyes of most of the international community,  Iran seeks 
to develop its nuclear program for the possible production of nuclear weapons. 
While Iran looks distant from the Western model of society,  Brazi l ian leaders 
reinforced that Brazi l ian foreign policy was based on “universal  values” such as 
the defense of human rights,  the crit icism to the proliferat ion of weapons of mass 
destruct ion and the condemnation of terrorism. The reiteration of this image and 
its  embedded values perpetuated – even unconsciously – the idea that countries 
and societies that were not total ly adapted or conformed to this standard were 
"dysfunctional" and "anomalous" in relat ion to "civi l ized" actors.  Through the 
adoption of a diplomatic vocabulary and the enhancement of communication 
channels,  Brazi l ian authorit ies tr ied to broker the fuel swap, but the U.S.  and 
European leaders cr it icized the Tehran Declaration for not el iminating the 
continued production of 19,75% enriched uranium inside Iranian territory.  
Brazi l ian authorit ies tr ied to increase their  relevance in world affairs by 
discipl ining Iran in modern structures of authority through mediation and trying to 
build trust .  However,  the U.S. and European leaders considered that Iran wanted 
to break international unity regarding its nuclear intentions. They rejected l inks 
between the Tehran Declaration and sanctions against Iran. Though Brazi l ian 
negotiators and the global  powers’  leaders opted for different methods,  it  is  
possible to identify in both init iat ives attempts to “discipline” and “domesticate” 
difference, as well  as its  assimilat ion into structures of authority where the threat 
it  symbolized could be el iminated in the name of stabil ity and well-being of the 
internat ional community.  
The mult iple attempts to “civi l ize rogue states” show the permanence of a 
modern regulat ive ambition that locates difference spat iotemporal ly in order to 
preserve peace.  As Amorim puts:  
  
We think that when we are in the Security Council ,  whether 
permanent or not,  we have to contribute to peace and security in the 
world and not just deal  with our own interests .  I have fol lowed this 
subject for a long t ime, and it  was a problem that I always thought 
had no solution unti l  I  heard about the swap agreement.  (…) And I 
thought maybe a country l ike Brazi l ,  which has this capacity for 
dialogue with several  countries, could somehow help. And so I 
discussed this subject with the Iranians.  President Ahmadinejad came 
here.  And I made tr ips to Iran, and I real ly found that it  was in 
principle possible to pursue that role (“The Soft-Power Power”). 
Amorim’s declaration shows that Brazi l  sees itself  as different from the 
“problem” that Iran brings and, instead, it  conceives itself  as part  of the 
“solution” in l ight of its  abil i ty to negotiate.  Brazil  was as a "student" of global 
powers in the "pedagogy of the competit ion" (Blaney and Inayatullah) when it  
adopted democratic and l iberal  orientations developed by such powers,  which was 
fundamental in winning support from those states and key international 
institutions. As it  became more adept and embedded in the “teacher’s” intel lectual 
world, this relat ionship changed:  Brazil ian decision-makers tr ied to prove that they 
can not only “teach” Iran on how to act ,  but also thought that global  powers could 
learn a lot from Brazi l ian lessons of deal ing,  in a more open and trustful way,  with 
countries tradit ional ly labeled as “rogue states”.   
Brazil’s relations with global powers 
Although Brazi l  shares the Western identity with global  powers,  other types 
of hierarchies operated simultaneously in their  relat ions. I  recognize there is  a lot  
of space for mediat ion with difference and sharing of values between Brazi l  and 
the U.S. or the European Union,  but many logocentr ic structures remain active.  
Brazi l ian decision-makers wanted to ensure that regime type and economic 
orthodoxy, for example,  were not used as tools of subtle control by leaders of 
dominant states.  Domination can be implemented in more subtle ways, special ly by 
  
the preservation of asymmetries in international institutions, which Brazil ian 
authorit ies crit icize very intensely.  Amorim said that: 
Unti l  recently al l  global  decisions were made by a handful of  
tradit ional powers. The permanent members of the Security Council  
— Britain, China, France, Russia and the U.S. ,  who are incidental ly 
the five nuclear powers recognized as such by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty — had (and st i l l  have) the privi lege of deal ing the 
cards on matters of international peace and security.  The G-8 was in 
charge of important decis ions affecting the global economy. In 
questions related to internat ional  trade,  the ‘Quad’ — the U.S. ,  the 
European Union,  Japan and Canada — dominated the scene (Amorim, 
“Let ’s  Hear From the New Kids on the Bloc”).  
Amorim recognized that developing countries had more participat ion in 
world polit ics,  but asymmetries were preserved: 
On Apri l  15,  Brasi l ia was host to two consecutive meetings at  the 
highest polit ical  level:  the second BRIC (Brazi l ,  Russia,  India and 
China) summit and the fourth IBSA Dialogue Forum (India,  Brazil  
and South Africa).  Such groups, different as they are,  show a 
wil l ingness and a commitment from emerging powers to redefine 
world governance. Many commentators singled out these twin 
meetings as more relevant than recent G-7 or G-8 gatherings.(…) 
Paradoxical ly,  issues related to internat ional  peace and security — 
some might say the “hard core” of global  polit ics — remain the 
exclusive territory of a small  group of countries (“Let’s Hear From 
the New Kids on the Bloc”). 
When talking about the Tehran Declarat ion,  Amorim (“Let ’s Hear From the 
New Kids on the Bloc”) saw that emerging powers such as Brazil  could “disturb 
the status quo” when deal ing with subjects “that would be typical ly handled by the 
  
P5+1 (the f ive permanent members of the Security Council  plus Germany)”, but he 
also recognized that “the tradit ional centers of power wil l  not share gladly their 
privi leged status”. Brazi l ian decision-makers recognized the obsolescence of old 
types of domination by global powers,  such as open conquest or colonization, but 
indicated the existence of more subtle forms of crystal l ization of hierarchies that 
revived old myths of submission of weaker or less developed countries.  Most of 
those myths were revived by the growing unilateral ism of global powers,  which 
contrast  to what Amorim (“The Soft-Power Power”) cal led Brazil ’s  “unique 
characterist ic which is  very useful  in international negotiat ions:  to be able to put 
itself  in someone else's shoes,  which is essential  if  you are looking for a solution”. 
The supposed arrogance of global powers dealing with some international issues 
were constantly condemned by Brazi l ian leaders and officers.  As Amorim puts,  
“[t ]here are things we [Brazi l ians] are able to say (…) that we would not be able i f  
I  just  go to the world podium and say,  ‘Here I am; I 'm a great guy. I 'm a self-
r ighteous guy. And you have to do what I say’ .  (…) They [global  powers] may 
think they have the moral authority,  but they won't  be heard” (“The Soft-Power 
Power”) .  
The maintenance of hierarchies between “us” and “them”, identity and 
difference is  more explicit  in Brazi l ’s relat ions with the U.S. .  According to Andrew 
Hurrel l ,  both countries have a consensual posit ion over substantive values that 
coexist  with a deep disagreement over the procedural values.  This means that they 
agree on the importance of democracy and l iberal values,  but they disagree on 
which values from the l iberal basket should be given priority.  Part icularly after 
September 11th 2001,  those Western l iberal  values were emphasized in Brazil ian 
foreign pol icy,  but that was not a synonym for full-scope adherence to policies 
adopted by the U.S. For example, while the U.S. authorit ies defended a more 
interventionist perspective on the defense of democracy and the design of 
institutions in similar models to its own society,  Brazi l ians adopted a minimal and 
less interventionist definit ion of the term that encompassed free elections and 
institutions and the rule of law. I agree with Hurrell  about the consensus on 
substantive values, but I  think the real clashes of interest ,  a long with deep and 
  
persistent divergences between Brazi l  and the U.S.  in the way they view the 
internat ional context have deeper motivations. The common frustrat ion in 
relat ions between those countries and the absence of close engagement has to do, 
in my opinion, with the reiteration of hierarchies in the bilateral  relations that 
updates old discourses of domination and imperial ism, even in a context of close 
commercial  and polit ical  relat ions between both states.  The U.S. represented a 
threat to Brazi l ian interests of preserving leadership in South America and among 
developing countries.  
Brazi l ’s init iat ive toward a leading role in South America is vis ible in the 
creation of the Union of South American Nations in 2008 and the strengthening of 
the 1978 Amazon Pact.  Nevertheless,  fears that Brazi l  could assemble South 
America into a s ingle bloc in order to destabil ize U.S.  presence in the Americas 
grew strong after Brazi l ian reluctance to fol low the American init iat ive to 
revital ize its inter-American leadership. Brazi l ian authorit ies have also shown their 
resistance to U.S.  interventionist  init iat ives in Latin America,  which would open 
precedents that threaten sovereignty.  Brazi l ian leaders showed their condemnation, 
through bi lateral and mult i lateral  channels,  to the U.S. supported coup d’état 
against  Hugo Chávez (Santiso).  They also crit icized U.S.  support for Colombia’s 
war against  drug traff icking and guerr i l la forces – that could be used as a pretext 
for U.S. presence in the Amazon region – and showed strong reservations 
regarding U.S. concern with intel l igence and police control in the Triple Border 
between the cit ies of Puerto Iguazu, Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu, 
supposedly a sanctuary for Islamic terrorism (Hirst) .   
In economic affairs ,  Brazi l ian authorit ies defended that the FTAA (Free 
Trade Area of the Americas) structure should l ie upon the exist ing blocs in order 
to consolidate existing sub-regional init iat ives and their bargaining power towards 
the U.S. and Nafta.  In 1997, Brazil  assumed a more affirmative stance based on the 
indivisible nature of the negotiat ing package, the coexistence between FTAA and 
the exist ing agreements and non-exclusion of any sector in negotiat ions related to 
access to markets or the el imination of barriers.  In the beginning of last  decade,  
  
the Brazi l ian government’s perception was that the U.S. administrat ion wanted to 
consolidate the implementat ion of l iberal reforms and force the unilateral opening 
of Latin American economies,  creat ing commercial  advantages with the reduction 
of barriers to its exports.  Furthermore, the U.S. Congress was not wi l l ing to make 
concessions, such as the el imination of agriculture subsidies and the revis ion of 
antidumping legis lation (Bouzas,  “El ‘nuevo regional ismo’ y el  Área de Libre 
Comercio de las Américas: un enfoque menos indulgente”; Cortes).  Brazi l ian 
authorit ies started to develop the image of the U.S. as a threat connected to 
intentions of creating a hemispheric institutional and legal architecture for its  
hegemonic interests.  Brazi l  feared the dismantling of its  industr ies and national 
services because of the high level  of competit iveness of American companies and 
the possible negative impacts on its trade balance.   
Before the interruption of FTAA negotiat ions in 2005,  Lula’s government 
indicated that,  even if the FTAA were created, Brazi l  would not become an 
uncondit ional al ly of the U.S. .  Similar positions were defended by Brazil  in 
multi lateral  forums where it  was an active player regarding the definit ion of rules.  
In mult i lateral  trade negotiat ions, Brazi l ian negotiators cr it icized the subsidization 
of agriculture and excessive U.S. demands regarding new issues such as the 
enforcement of intellectual property r ights .  One of the major issues during the 
WTO Doha Development Round – which started in 2001 – was the debate on 
pharmaceutical  l icensing and public health programs, especial ly concerning the use 
of non-l icensed pharmaceuticals in Brazi l ian anti-HIV/AIDS programs (Hirst) .  
The Brazi l ian government and NGOs consider the U.S.  posit ion as a threat not 
only to the industry of generic pharmaceuticals,  but also to health care programs 
for Brazi l ian society.  Divergences that expose persistent hierarchies and the 
diff iculty in dealing with the U.S. were also vis ible in Brazil ’s mult i lateral  posit ion 
towards nuclear non-prol iferat ion and nuclear disarmament issues. In spite of 
constant U.S.  pressures,  the Brazi l ian government refused to sign the IAEA 
Additional Protocol,  partial ly because the reinforced safeguards system could 
create obstacles for the safety of nat ional ultracentrifuge technology. Nevertheless,  
Brazi l ian authorit ies also saw that reinforced safeguards were not sustainable 
  
without paralle l  developments by the nuclear-weapon states regarding nuclear 
disarmament (Rublee 54).  Brazil  st i l l  saw nuclear-weapon states such as the U.S.  as 
threats because they did not l ive up to the commitments of NPT’s Article VI to 
el iminate nuclear arsenals.  Lula declared that “[t ]he existence of weapons of mass 
destruct ion is what makes the world more dangerous,  not agreements with Iran” 
(Lula,  “Nuclear Weapons Make the World More Dangerous, Not Agreements with 
Iran”).  
Brazi l ’s relat ions with the European Union were also characterized by the 
preservation of hierarchies,  though in a more subtle way.  The European Union 
developed a strategy of engagement with Lat in American countries based on the 
promotion of economic development and global project ion of European values and 
interests.  The change in those relat ions was connected to the l iberal ization of 
European economies,  the attempt to highl ight the European Union in the new 
global economic polit ics and the competit ion with the U.S. for new markets.  The 
model of cooperation developed by the European Union is  based on partnership,  
inspired by notions of equal ity and cooperat ion that transcend power inequalit ies 
and supposedly chal lenge the notion of hierarchies.  Inter-regional ism might 
encompass pol it ical  and inst itutional reforms, as well  as social  inclusion and the 
overcoming of power imbalances between Europe and Latin America.  The 
European Union tries to show that i t  is  more concerned with a type of cooperation 
in which the North assumes responsibil i t ies for the South’s development and 
encourages transformations related to social  responsibil i ty and participation of 
civi l  society (Grugel) .  It  was a way to minimize domination and submission 
stereotypes created by colonial ism. However, new hierarchies emerge and 
rearticulate old myths of domination of European powers and dependency of 
Southern countries in contemporary t imes. In this context,  Brazi l ian authorit ies 
see, behind the benevolent image of European strategy of partnership,  the 
persistence of hierarchies that translate into protectionist  barr iers by the European 
Union against  the access of Brazi l ian and Latin American export to its markets.  
Those barriers consolidate exclusion and represent a threat to Brazi l ian 
development,  relegat ing the country to an inferior posit ion in l ight of its  necessity 
  
to export agricultural  products for economic growth. Brazi l ian polit icians and 
businessmen understood the maintenance of strict  rules that damage free trade as a 
threat to the development of the Brazi l ian economy and to the preservation of the 
country’s identity as an emerging country.   
Final considerations  
Although there is space for mediation and interaction with difference in 
Brazi l ’s  relations with other countries,  mechanisms of exclusion persist  and create 
obstacles to the development of common experiences towards the destabi l izat ion 
of hierarchies and the sharing of values that transcend coexistence. Difference 
represented by underdeveloped and other developing countries was conceived as 
“backwardness” in relat ion to l iberal  and democratic models of development 
achieved by Brazi l .  Global  powers were seen as “ambitious” through the revival 
and adaptation of old colonial discourses.  Negative visions of difference persist  
and are constantly updated, reinvented and rearticulated. It  would be very 
s implist ic to say that this argumentation constructs the idea that,  if  Brazi l  
recognizes that it  has a more dynamic economy than his South American neighbors 
or his African partners,  it  would be evidence of Brazi l ’s  prepotency. It  would also 
be l imited to affirm that ,  if  in the commercial  and economic trade disputes with 
stronger powers (the U.S.,  European Union, etc.)  Brazil  moves towards protecting 
its national interest ,  it  would be considered instantaneously a subtle indicat ion of a 
dichotomist suspicious and resentful  posture.  What is being defended here is that 
Brazi l ian foreign policy might reflect deeply internal ized notions of the 
depreciat ion of difference,  which create obstacles to better polit ical  solutions for 
many problems in the relat ions with other countries.   
I  do not suggest in this art icle that the appreciat ion for dialogue and 
negotiat ion would require Brazi l ian authorit ies to del iberately ignore the existence 
of r ich and poor countries , weak and strong states or even the anarchic 
characterist ic of the internat ional system. Instead, Brazil ian leaders and society 
should consider those categories,  but not take them for granted or as immutable 
elements of the international context.  The destabil ization of the pre-given 
  
polarization between "advanced" and "backward" countries,  societies that are "fit  
for development" and "unfit  for development", opens the possibil i ty for a crit ical 
reflection of Brazil ’s actions and the ways it  internalized l iberal  proposals.  It  may 
also highlight ways to redefine policies aimed at  reducing inequality with a denser 
and more precise knowledge of suffering of other societies,  the recognit ion of 
common aspects between these experiences and the intensif icat ion of dialogue in 
new terms in order to overcome oppression. When it  is  possible to identify 
elements of exclusion similar to other societ ies in its own polit ical ,  socioeconomic 
and cultural  experience – the "Other within" –, Brazi l ians may reinforce dialogue 
with other societ ies and have more comprehension of their own society.  This  
dialogue would be implemented through the analysis of domestic and foreign 
mechanisms that reproduce oppression and marginalization of peripheral  societies 
in the international system and the development of better responses to such 
problems. Such efforts – which would be taken not only in relations with 
developing, but also developed countries – can be carried out through different 
ways. One first  step could be the increased interaction of Itamaraty with other 
ministr ies to develop programs with foreign counterparts,  a imed at  strengthening 
technical cooperat ion in tackling problems related to issues such as health care, 
educat ion and public safety,  for example. Brazi l ian authorit ies can learn from 
mistakes and successes of its partners in implementing these programs 
domestical ly .  Paradiplomacy and the involvement of subnational actors such as 
municipal it ies and federal  state’s governments may be important,  given that many 
of these policies are put in practice at  levels below the national level .  
I do not assume the immutabil i ty of the international system as an arena of 
confl ict  in which foreign policies are determined with the considerat ion of 
relat ions between several self- interested states.  So it  is  possible,  according to the 
main argument developed in this art icle, to develop multiple ways to recognize 
practices of exclusion and share experiences of suffer ing and oppression in order 
to replace them with new proposals that crit ical ly reinvent international relat ions 
as intercultural  relat ions of sharing and understanding.  
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